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Washington Post, June 28, 2007
negAtive viewS oF U.S. PerSiSt, deSPite  
FAith in obAmA
Inter Press Service, July 7, 2009
U.S. standing—its position with respect to reputation, stature, or prestige in world affairs—declined dramatically in the past decade. Many American leaders and 
citizens worry that this decline, despite a recent upturn, may be part of a long-term trend that 
will be hard to reverse. 
In a summer 2008 poll, more Americans ranked “improving American standing in the 
world” as “very important” (versus “somewhat” or “not” important) than any other foreign 
policy goal listed, including “protecting the jobs of American workers” and “preventing the 
spread of nuclear weapons”1 (See Figure 1)—and that was before the current economic crisis 
unleashed a new torrent of international criticism of the United States. 
Not surprisingly, perhaps, one of President Obama’s central foreign policy objectives 
has been to “restore American standing.” To date, Obama appears to enjoy broad confidence 
around the globe. Favorable foreign attitudes towards the United States have risen sharply. 
At the same time there are strong indications of continuing, deep global dissatisfaction with 
U.S. economic and military policies. This suggests that U.S. standing remains a significant 
political issue. The disjuncture between confidence in Obama and discontent with U.S. 
policies is a potentially troubling fault line for the United States and the Obama presidency.2
The decline in U.S. standing seems to both reflect and reinforce weakened U.S. 
diplomacy abroad and domestic troubles as well. But is this true? What causes standing 
to rise or fall, and what happens when it does? Would a better understanding of standing 
help the United States to drive or manage those consequences, good or bad? Perhaps most 
important, what can be done to better protect and enhance America’s standing in the future? 
Those are the questions the American Political Science Association Task Force sought to 
explore and to answer. 
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We believe that “standing” is significant for both scholarship and policy. Scholars 
recognize that even as a country’s military and economic power remain constant, its standing 
can affect its relative influence in world politics.3 Although political scientists rarely use the 
word “standing,” they have invoked terms such as prestige, reputation, credibility, moral 
stature, authority, and legitimacy to capture this effect.4 We focus on standing because it has 
become the term of art in contemporary public discussions, and U.S. officials have focused on 
related concepts since at least the Second World War.
In the policy world, many leaders also recognize that standing matters; as Colin Powell 
once argued, “diplomacy uses the reputation of power to achieve what power itself often 
cannot achieve, or can achieve only at greater and sometimes excessive cost.”5 And this is not 
the first time the United States has experienced a decline in standing: it occurred in the 1970s, 
during and after the Viet Nam war, and in the early 1980s, during the Euromissile controversy 
(See Figure 2). Of course, preserving standing is not the only concern of U.S. officials; other 
aims that damage standing may at times deserve priority. But our hope is that, by helping 
to shed light on how standing is bestowed and why it matters, we can aid in understanding, 
restoring, safeguarding, and bolstering U.S. standing going forward.
Source: Chicago Council Report on “Troubled by Loss of Standing in the World, Americans Support Major Foreign Policy Changes”, September 2008. 
http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/UserFiles/File/POS_Topline%20Reports/POS%202008/2008%20Public%20Opinion_Foreign%20Policy.pdf
(accessed July 24, 2009).
Figure 1: U.S. Foreign Policy Goals
Percent
Percentage who think the following should be very, somewhat, or not important foreign policy goals of the United States.
Improving America’s standing in the world
Protecting the jobs of American workers
Securing adequate supplies of energy
Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons
Combating international terrorism
Controlling and reducing illegal immigration
Maintaining superior military power worldwide
Combating world hunger
Limiting climate change
Strengthening the United Nations
Promoting international trade
Promoting and defending human rights in other countries
Protecting weaker nations against foreign aggression
Helping to bring a democratic form of 
government to other nations
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I. Standing and its Relevance 
What is “Standing”?
U nlike something a nation possesses and can easily measure, like wealth or military might, standing is an attribute assigned to the United States by actors beyond its 
borders—such as foreign leaders and peoples, international organizations, and transnational 
groups—and assessed by citizens within them. U.S. standing has both an absolute and a relative 
quality. It is absolute in the sense that it can be high or low and vary over time. It is relative 
in that we might want to know whether U.S. standing is better or worse than that of other 
countries or actors, such as China or the European Union.
Standing is multifaceted. In this study we are concerned with two key elements: 
credibility and esteem. Credibility refers to the U.S. government’s ability to do what it says it is 
going to do—to “stand up” for what it believes, and “stand against” threats to its interests and 
ideals. Esteem refers to America’s stature, or what America is perceived to “stand for” in the 
hearts and minds of foreign publics and policymakers. 
Sources: USIA XX series 1952-67, Eurobarometer series 1970-200, Pew Global Attitudes survey  2002, and Transatlantic Trend Survey 2002-4 as 
compiled and charted by Pierangelo Isernia, ”Anti-Americanism in Europe during the Cold War,” in Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane, 
eds. Anti-Americanisms in World Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 78. 
Figure 2:  Trend in Net European Attitudes toward the United States 
            (normalized average, yearly base).
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Credibility and esteem can be mutually reinforcing, but they can also be difficult to 
pursue in tandem—a trade-off implied by Machiavelli’s famous dictum: “it is much safer to be 
feared than loved.” 
Standing can be further illuminated by comparison with several related concepts: power 
(hard and soft), anti-Americanism, legitimacy, and reputation. 
In terms of both credibility and esteem, standing is densely interwoven with U.S. “hard 
power”—i.e., the nation’s material military and economic capabilities. U.S. capabilities help 
the nation to advance its interests and achieve its goals; and to the extent the United States 
has a technologically advanced military and robust wealthy economy, it will be attractive to or 
respected by others. 
 Yet, standing and capabilities are not the same thing. U.S. standing may vary even 
if U.S. hard power does not. Since 2000, for example, standing has declined (see Figure 3), 
but relative American power has been steady (see Figure 5 below). Instead, we can say that 
standing is often importantly influenced by changes in hard power. But such capabilities 
often do not speak for themselves. The manner in which they are deployed as well as the aims 
and values associated with their use also mold standing. As we will see, how people think 
about power and its utility mediates how they view standing. 
Similarly, standing overlaps with, but differs from, soft power, which, as Joseph Nye 
writes, “arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies.”6 Soft 
power refers to the ability to get what you want through appeal rather than coercion. Standing 
differs in that it is not something a country has but something that others bestow upon it, and 
it can thus rise and fall even as a country’s attractiveness remains relatively constant.
 Standing also can be distinguished from pro- or anti-Americanism. Standing is not 
about whether others are for or against the United States, but instead whether they view 
the United States as a credible actor with traits that should be admired or emulated. Anti-
Americanism is often a matter of individual opinion; standing reflects a collective social 
assessment of the U.S.’s position for a particular audience.7 And while public opinion surveys 
can take the pulse of personal views, a more sophisticated measure of U.S. credibility and 
esteem requires using other, often indirect, 
measures. These might include analysis 
of mass media, certain types of group 
votes (e.g. at the UN), “grades” from non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and 
other rating agencies, demand for U.S. 
education, and the frequency with which U.S. legal precedents are cited in international 
court cases.
If legitimacy is “conforming to recognized principles or accepted rules and standards,” 
then we can easily see it as distinct from standing while at the same time able to influence it.8 
That is, adhering to certain principles may either help or impede a state’s perceived position, 
but it is different from that position itself, which can also be influenced by other factors. 
In contrast, standing and reputation have much in common and are almost synonyms. 
Standing might be taken as a particular kind of reputation—one related to national position 
Standing is not about whether others are for or 
against the United States, but instead whether 
they view the United States as a credible actor 
with traits that should be admired or emulated.
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1999/ 
2000 2002 2003 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Figures in Percent
U.S. — — — 83 76 80 84 88
Canada 71 72 63 59 — 55 — 68
Britain 83 75 70 55 56 51 53 69
France 62 62 42 43 39 39 42 75
Germany 78 60 45 42 37 30 31 64
Spain 50 — 38 41 23 34 33 58
Poland 86 79 — 62 — 61 68 67
Russia 31 61 37 52 43 41 46 44
Turkey 52 30 15 23 12 9 12 14
Egypt  — — — — 30 21 22 27
Jordan — 25 1 21 15 20 19 25
Lebanon — 36 27 42 — 47 51 55
Palestinian territories — — * — — 13 — 15
Israel — — 78 — — 78 — 71
China — — — 42 47 34 41 47
India — 66 — 71 56 59 66 76
Indonesia 75 61 15 38 30 29 37 63
Japan 77 72 — — 63 61 50 59
Pakistan 23 10 13 23 27 15 19 16
South Korea 58 52 46 — — 58 70 78
Argentina 50 34 — — — 16 22 38
Brazil 56 51 35 — — 44 47 61
Mexico 68 64 — — — 56 47 69
Kenya 94 80 — — — 87 — 90
Nigeria 46 76 61 — 62 70 64 79
Figure 3:  U.S Favorability Rating*
1999/2000 survey trends provided by the Office of Research, U.S. Department of State, Question 11a. 
* % Respondents with a favorable opinion of the United States
Source:  Pew Global Attitudes Project, “Confidence in Obama Lifts U.S. Image Around the World.”  
Released July 23, 2009  http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=264 (accessed July 23, 2009).
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in the world. Reputation, like standing, might apply either to credibility or to esteem. But 
standing has a more relative connotation in that it refers to position within a particular 
setting—in this case the society of states or “international community.”
Why Does Standing Matter?
Why should policymakers—or political scientists—care about standing at all? 
First, recent history suggests that standing can play a fundamental role in the shaping 
of strategy. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, President George W. Bush initiated a new 
national strategy for the United States that favored the credibility dimension of standing—
emphasizing a policy package of assertive unilateralism, preventive use of force, and aggressive 
democratization. The administration achieved some initial successes, swiftly toppling the 
Taliban in Afghanistan, securing dismantlement of Libya’s nuclear program, and encouraging 
an apparent halt or slow-down in Iran’s nuclear weaponization program. 
Yet, over time, despite the lack of further terrorist attacks on U.S. soil, the Bush 
administration’s single-minded approach lost significant support at home and abroad, as the 
United States grew mired in Iraq, was accused of violations of international law, and drew 
international criticism and resentment—even as Osama bin Laden remained at large. The 
attendant declines in standing, in terms of both credibility and esteem, only made it harder 
for the United States to be effective in foreign affairs—prompting the Bush administration to 
take what some saw as a reverse course after 2005, returning to a posture that was more akin 
to the typical pattern of American internationalism since World War II.9 
More distant history speaks to the significance of standing as well. During the long 
period of Cold War competition with the Soviet Union, the United States was intent that its 
commitment to protect its allies, especially those in Europe, would be seen as credible by both 
Soviet leaders and Europeans. U.S. participation in the Korean and Viet Nam wars was spurred 
by the fear that a perception of diminished U.S. credibility would lead others to join a rising 
Communist tide. The United States acted to protect its standing as defender of the free world.10 
Historically, some U.S. presidents have worried about the consequences of falling 
standing and hoped for the benefits of rising standing. John F. Kennedy, for example, attached 
great weight to America’s image in the world. A heavy consumer of USIA multi-nation surveys, 
he viewed them as an early warning system on international perceptions of the United 
States and a means to make U.S. foreign policy more responsive to global trends.11 Dwight 
Eisenhower also worried about the U.S. image overseas in his case, how the country’s domestic 
policies might affect its international esteem. Eisenhower’s decision to enforce Brown v. Board 
in Little Rock in 1957, for example, reflected concerns about how U.S. action (or inaction) on 
desegregation would be viewed in the Third World.12 
Jimmy Carter’s decision to seek ratification of the Panama Canal Treaty, which cost 
him politically at home, was also influenced by concerns about U.S. legitimacy and moral 
standing abroad.13 Ronald Reagan worked to raise perceptions of American standing in 
terms of the credibility of America’s military and economic capabilities, using that influence 
to help end the Cold War. Other leaders such as Lyndon Johnson and George W. Bush heeded 
standing less, or at least less successfully—and the political price extended to their aspiring 
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successors as well, as standing worked against Hubert Humphrey’s and John McCain’s 
campaigns for the White House. 
Diminished standing may make it harder for the United States to get things done in 
world politics. Despite the world’s high economic growth rates since the mid-1980s, achieved 
under the auspices of the so-called Washington consensus, in the past year the standing of 
the U.S. economic model and position in 
the world has suffered; insistence on new 
regulatory standards, sharp differences 
on how to combat the deep recession 
that is gripping the world, protectionist 
tendencies and calls for a new reserve 
currency all point to eroding confidence 
in the American model, which may have broader consequences; U.S. intelligence chief Dennis 
Blair testified in February 2009 that the crisis “has increased criticism about free market 
policies, which may make it difficult to achieve long-time U.S. objectives . . . It already has 
increased questioning of U.S. stewardship of the global economy and the international 
financial structure.”14 
Conversely, increased standing has benefits. Part of the reason the Bush administration 
returned in 2005 to the Six Party Talks it had initiated on North Korea was because the 
United States was experiencing isolation from the perceived unilateralism of the first Bush 
term. That renewed engagement helped to restore goodwill and respect for U.S. leadership 
in Asia, which in turn fostered support for other U.S.-led initiatives in the region, such as 
encouraging the “win-win” Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate that 
promotes the use of clean energy technology. 
It may be useful to think of standing as the everyday currency of America’s existence 
in the world, the foreign-policy equivalent of domestic “political capital.” It has intrinsic 
value, including in Americans’ self-image, even when it has no readily observable behavioral 
implications.
II. Three Audiences of U.S. Standing 
W ho or what bestows standing on the United States? We have focused on three primary audiences. The first is other major countries and regions of the world. One 
could imagine that U.S. standing may differ according to a number of factors including 
the geography, economic development, or religious orientation of particular political 
communities. Our aim was to understand how foreign government elites, non-government 
elites, and citizens in various parts of the world interpret and react to U.S. standing. 
A second is the network of international actors that includes formal organizations such 
as the United Nations or the World Trade Organization, non-governmental organizations, 
and the more informal ties of people across borders captured in the terms “global civil 
society” or “world society.” 
A third audience that evaluates U.S. standing exists within the American polity itself. 
The aim here is to clarify how U.S. officials and citizens view the country as a global actor. 
...insistence on new regulatory standards, sharp 
differences on how to combat the deep recession 
that is gripping the world, protectionist tendencies 
and calls for a new reserve currency all point to 
eroding confidence in the American model...
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For each audience, the pressing questions about standing are the same. What is the 
track record of standing? Has it risen or fallen, and if so, why? And how do changes in U.S. 
standing in one arena influence standing in the others? 
Regions
One indicator of  U.S. standing is found in polls of foreign opinion. These polls have many 
limitations, especially in authoritarian countries, but they nonetheless deserve attention.15 
Global opinion towards the United States has fluctuated since the 1960s and experienced 
a particularly deep downturn between 2002 and 2007. In the past two years, favorable public 
attitudes towards the United States have turned sharply upward, especially in 2009. 
The early months of the Obama administration have brought global enthusiasm for 
and confidence in the President’s abilities. This has had a strong, positive impact on foreign 
attitudes towards the United States. This “Obama effect” is based on the “honeymoon period” 
of a new President, his acknowledged rhetorical skills, and what his election signifies about 
the openness of America. 
In policy terms, many abroad like such Obama policies as closing Guantanamo 
and leaving Iraq; they do not like putting more troops in Afghanistan. More broadly, 
most believe that there has been little change in the U.S. disregard for the interests of 
their country, and that U.S. influence in 
the world is still mostly bad (India and 
Kenya are two notable exceptions).16  It is 
likely that the disconnect between high 
expectations of what the United States 
should do in the years ahead and what 
it actually can and will do will pose a 
persistent challenge for managing U.S. standing. That task will require close attention to 
variation in standing across regions.
The decline was uneven across different world regions: very strong in the Middle East 
and Europe; strong in Latin America and Southeast Asia; and, with some notable exceptions, 
less pronounced in Africa and South and East Asia. The recent recovery in these opinion polls 
has also been uneven, with the most significant improvements in Europe and the Americas 
(See Figure 3).17  Although these regional trends conceal substantial national and issue 
differences and cannot rely on quantitative data alone, it is still useful to reflect on such cross-
regional variations.18  
Elites vs. Masses. One way in which regions vary involves differences between national 
elites and the general public. An important predictor of U.S. standing among foreign elites 
is whether U.S. policy is perceived to be helping or harming their interests. General publics, 
however, tend to focus on the justness and morality of U.S. conduct. When foreign publics 
deem the United States is not playing by the rules, is applying double standards, and is 
engaging in hypocrisy, U.S. standing suffers. The legacy of Iranian hostility towards the 
United States has roots in America’s overthrow of Mohammad Mosaddeq and support for the 
Shah despite professed adherence to self-determination/liberal democratic norms. 
It is likely that the disconnect between high 
expectations of what the United States should 
do in the years ahead and what it actually can 
and will do will pose a persistent challenge for 
managing U.S. standing.
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The disjuncture between national elites and mass publics has led to different political 
dynamics in the Middle East and in Europe, the two regions that have seen American 
standing plunge most sharply. In the Middle East, authoritarian regimes are often quietly 
more supportive of American policy than they can say publicly. Mass publics’ critical view of 
America and U.S. policy is often also a political indictment of their own regimes, which are 
cooperating with the United States. American policies thus tend to produce diametrically 
opposed results at government and popular levels. Policies that improve American standing 
with Arab governments, such as being tough on Saddam Hussein’s Iraq or on Khameni’s 
Iran, tend to please rulers and irritate public opinion. Likewise, many Arab leaders were 
happy to see Israel bomb Hamas and Hezbollah, but the attacks infuriated the Arab public.
In Europe, by contrast, democratically elected governments by and large express the 
sentiments of the citizenry. If there are divergences in views between elites and publics, as 
there were in several countries on the issue of the Iraq war of 2003, they tend to become 
prominent issues in the next election campaign or government transition. This was true in 
elections in France (Sarkozy 2007) and Germany (Merkel 2005) as well as in Spain (Zapatero 
2004) and Blair’s resignation in Great Britain (2007). 
In regions where U.S. standing has declined somewhat less, such as Latin America and 
Southeast Asia, or held constant or improved, as in East Asia and Africa, the gap between 
elites and mass attitudes is politically less salient. At the same time, perceptions of a lack of 
U.S. attention to particular regions can affect standing. Leaders in South Asia and Africa 
have often complained that the United States is either too indifferent to or ignorant of their 
regions’ instabilities or human suffering. 
While the political dynamics of American standing play out differently in authoritarian 
and democratic regions, this does not mean that one or the other leads to a more favorable or 
hostile disposition. Across all of the world’s 
major regions, the erosion of American 
standing has been greatest in the regions 
that are the least democratic (the Middle 
East) and the most democratic (Europe). 
Whether in dictatorships or democracies, U.S. standing may be seen differently by mass 
publics versus leaders.
Different Meanings. Not surprisingly, U.S. standing is assessed differently in different 
regional contexts. These different assessments are shaped by different priorities, different 
regional threats, and different degrees of regional integration and identity. 
In the Middle East, the professed U.S. policy of democratization since 2002 threatened 
authoritarian regimes; and perceived U.S. disengagement from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
reinforced the view that the United States was neither a fair nor an engaged arbiter in the 
conflict. In East Asia, the continued availability of American markets for East Asian exports 
had a strong effect on national prosperity; this strengthened America’s standing among 
elites and the public. Despite the large amount of economic and military assistance that 
the United States provides to Pakistan’s elites, its standing remains extremely low among 
the public, who resent past U.S. support of the country’s military dictators and massive 
intervention in the country’s domestic politics. In addition, many Europeans believed that 
Across all of the world’s major regions, the erosion 
of American standing has been greatest in the 
regions that are the least democratic (the Middle 
East) and the most democratic (Europe). 
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the American turn toward unilateralism and the doctrine of preemptive war was unraveling 
the multilateral fabric of Europe’s preferred international order. President Obama’s leadership 
style is reassuring European publics greatly without eliminating lingering suspicions that his 
presidency may represent a change in style rather than substance. 
American standing in a relative sense is influenced by the presence of a major regional 
power. Where such a power exists and is hostile, as in Cold War Europe (Soviet Union) 
or potentially not benign, as in contemporary East Asia (China) and South Asia (India), 
American standing is somewhat protected by fears that domination by the regional power 
would be even worse. Even in the Middle East, Iran’s regional aspirations give the United 
States some strong support among the elites of Sunni states. In Latin America, where there 
has traditionally been no dominant regional power, American standing was more exposed 
(though that may now be changing with Brazil’s emergence on the global stage). And while 
there is no regional power in Africa, the memory of European colonial rule gives the United 
States a substantial measure of esteem and credibility by comparison. Here we see one of the 
ways in which relative power and threat influence assessments of credibility and esteem. 
There is, as of yet, no clear finding that U.S. relative standing is suffering in terms of 
credibility or esteem based on the rise of “competing” models offered by Europe, China, 
or even Russia. Polls in 2009 suggest recent declines in the relative attractiveness of these 
actors.19  At the same time, the economic 
meltdown of 2008–09 has prompted 
widespread critiques of the U.S. economic 
model; serious political fallout from this 
crisis may still lie ahead, as waning esteem 
may limit the credibility of the United States in economic affairs. Some herald the “Beijing 
consensus”—a Chinese approach that promises capitalist development without political 
interference—as a replacement for the U.S. model. The “status” of the dollar as the global 
reserve currency is increasingly a topic of discussion.20  
America’s standing may in some places and at some times also be affected by the notion 
of regional identity. In regions where elites have regional identities in addition to national 
ones, American standing diminishes.21 For example, the building of a European polity 
during the last 25 years was, in part, a conscious political attempt to delink Europe from 
American policies and to evolve what many European political elites (though perhaps not 
the European public) see as a better political model for Europe and the world. EU economic 
might sustains this belief. This has contributed to the recent loop that American standing 
has taken in Europe, including among some of its oldest allies. Germany went from a 78 
percent favorable rating of the United States in 2000 to 31 percent in 2008, before a sharp 
recovery to 64 percent in 2009 (see Figure 3). In contrast, South Asia has no such region-wide 
identity, and American standing in India is as high as ever. 
Cross-regional public opinion research suggests that popular opposition to the United 
States is mostly shallow and benign, and thus prone to rapid swings.22 The main exception 
to this pattern is the Middle East, where a prevalent negative public opinion is the product 
of a critical view of the American polity, U.S. anti-terrorist policies, fear of U.S. military 
intervention, and the U.S. stance on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. 
There is, as of yet, no clear finding that U.S. relative 
standing is suffering in terms of credibility or esteem 
based on the rise of “competing” models offered by 
Europe, China, or even Russia.
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U.S. “standing in the world” is hardly monolithic. It is viewed differently across regions 
and policies, and such differences deserve attention in crafting policy.
Regional Roller Coaster.  Going forward, the likelihood of a rebound in America’s 
standing differs by region. In the Middle East, much will depend on what American 
diplomacy can accomplish in the settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and diplomacy 
with Iran. In South Asia, American standing will depend on successful U.S. management 
of contradictory pressures engulfing the region’s interstate and non-state conflicts. In East 
Asia, the way in which the Obama administration deals with economic and security issues 
will be the critical factor. If America responds to the global financial and economic crisis by 
providing fewer global and regional public goods, its standing will diminish in East Asia and 
dive once again in Europe. Similarly, if growing U.S. budget deficits require cuts in the recent 
expansion of American aid programs in Africa, this might also erode American standing in a 
continent where trends have been more positive in recent years.23  Here, economic and military 
capabilities in the form of aid or public goods are another way in which U.S. hard power 
shapes U.S. standing.
During the last four decades, while American standing has declined at times, it has 
bounced back because the American model continued to have strong appeal (i.e., esteem). 
One indicator of this is the continuing attractiveness of the U.S. higher educational system 
and the fact that many who come to study in the United States end up staying24 (See Figure 
4). An additional reason for America’s reestablished standing may be that American leaders 
have learned from their mistakes. In some cases the mistake may have been an excessive 
concern with credibility and capability as measures of standing (Presidents Kennedy and 
George W. Bush), in other cases perhaps a lack of concern or too much attention to esteem 
(President Carter).
Figure 4: International Students in the U.S. by Academic Level 
Source: Data from Carol Atkinson, "Does Soft Power Matter? A Comparative Analysis of Student Exchange Programs 1980-2006," unpublished 
manuscript, Vanderbilt University, Department of Political Science, Nashville, TN (2009) based on Institute of International Education statistics.
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International Organizations
International organizations, law, and global civil society play a crucial role in America’s 
standing in the world, providing settings in which the United States can articulate its goals 
and solve problems with other states. They also provide formal structures through which 
the rest of the world can publicly and collectively support American policies, or reject them. 
And as multilateralism’s critics point out, international organizations also provide vehicles 
through which other states can set forth competing agendas and organize to pursue policies 
not favored by the United States. Standing is essential to leadership in these institutions. 
Trends in IO Standing. Evidence of standing is more elusive in the category of 
“international society,” perhaps because the nature of that society is much less developed 
than in nation states. Still, we can get a sense of how U.S. standing has changed over time by 
considering how the United States is viewed in prominent international organizations like 
the United Nations, and by NGOs. 
Figure 5 tracks international support for U.S. votes in the UN General Assembly 
(UNGA) since World War II. The United States was instrumental in the UN’s creation, yet, 
as Figure 5 illustrates, support for U.S. positions within UNGA has declined considerably 
over time—a trend that began as early as the 1960s, accelerated during the Reagan years, and, 
despite an uptick following the USSR’s collapse, resumed its downward slide in the mid-1990s. 
The drop in support for the United States is especially pronounced during the George W. 
Bush administration, with agreement between the United States and Latin America, African, 
Middle Eastern, and Asian countries plummeting by around 50 percent in the last decade 
alone. Astonishingly, the absolute level of 
agreement today between the United States 
and the typical country in each region 
is below the level of agreement between 
America and its existential rival, the Soviet 
Union, at the height of the Cold War.25 
Although the data are not always consistent or reliable, various country rankings by 
both IOs and NGOs paint a similar picture of decline—even in areas in which the United 
States has traditionally prided itself as a leader. In the Reporters without Borders Press 
Freedom Index, for example, the United States has fallen from number 17 in 2002 to number 
36 in 2008, below Mali, Ghana, and Slovakia.26  
 Sometimes a new organization can herald a change in standing. The rise of the G20 as 
a replacement for the G8 in economic affairs inevitably dilutes the sway of the U.S. in global 
economic governance (as it does for the other G8 countries). Its new prominence as a forum of 
heads of state, not just finance ministers, is a result of the economic crisis of 2008–2009 and 
the related critique of the United States as the downturn’s source.
Sources of Standing. Why has U.S. standing in the United Nations eroded? 
In part, this is because the sheer number of countries in the world has risen, from 151 
in 1973 to more than 190 today. This means more competing interests on the global agenda, 
interests with the potential to diverge from those of the United States. 
Astonishingly, the absolute level of agreement today 
between the United States and the typical country in 
each region is below the level of agreement between 
America and its existential rival, the Soviet Union, at 
the height of the Cold War.25
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But two additional factors have come into play that reflect on America itself: first, a 
growing sense that Washington is no longer a dependable “team player,” and second, a fear 
that Americans may be less committed to providing international public goods today than 
they were during the Cold War. It is clear is that when the United States is seen as acting as a 
“team player,” it can have positive repercussions for U.S. standing, whereas perceptions of U.S. 
unilateralism can have the opposite effect. Whether these perceptions of U.S. behavior are 
accurate is open to debate, but when it comes to America’s standing in the world, perceptions 
define the reality. 
When the United States fails to sign 
and ratify high-profile, widely accepted 
international agreements, for example, its 
international standing falls, as has been 
the case with the Kyoto Protocol.27  The 
United States has ratified over one hundred other environmental agreements, which is over 
twice as many as Canada and France and five times as many as Japan.28  Yet the U.S. is known 
internationally largely for its unwillingness to ratify Kyoto. 
The United States has ratified over one hundred 
other environmental agreements . . . yet the U.S. is 
known internationally largely for its unwillingness 
to ratify Kyoto. 
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American standing also falls when Washington violates international laws and norms 
and fails to comply with U.S. treaty commitments and values. For example, violations of high-
profile agreements, such as the Geneva Convention on torture, have clearly hurt U.S. standing 
as measured by opinion polls, statements by foreign governments, and NGOs.29  Evidence of 
prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo severely damaged the global esteem in which 
the U.S. was held, especially among its allies.30  
U.S. reluctance to commit to new international legal obligations may in part be due to 
a generally strong compliance record with international law. Unlike some states, the U.S. is 
hesitant to sign agreements with which it knows it cannot comply. Nonetheless, a few high-
profile cases wash out the effects of U.S. adherence to almost all of its other international 
treaty obligations. Perhaps perceived U.S. hypocrisy is more deleterious because we hold 
ourselves up—or others look to us—as a model.
If the United States pursues controversial, high-profile policies through unilateral 
means when multilateral ones are expected, U.S. standing will likely suffer. This pattern 
seems apparent at the United Nations, where agreement with the United States increased 
significantly with the demise of the Cold War in the late 1980s. This was the time when the 
United States had newfound relative material power as the sole remaining superpower. The 
United States was also trumpeting a new form of international community. As President 
George H. W. Bush put it, the United States would “pursue our national interests, wherever 
possible, within a framework of concert with our friends and the international community.”31  
It was a vision of a collaborative world in which the United States’ unchecked dominance 
would be used for jointly agreed ends.
This sentiment peaked by the end of Clinton’s first term, when countries arguably 
began to detect rising instances of the U.S. unilateral exercise of power, such as declining 
to sign the Ottawa Convention on the Banning of Land Mines, refusing to pay its UN dues, 
failing to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, not waiting for UN Security Council 
approval before the 1998 bombing of Iraq, not seeking UN approval in the bombing campaign 
against Serbia in the spring of 1999. In the subsequent Bush years, perceptions of American 
unilateralism increased significantly due to a string of early decisions and rhetoric on the 
ABM treaty, the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court, and then the invasion 
of Iraq.32  Today, unilateral U.S. policies in response to the economic crisis (think “Buy 
American”) may have a similar negative impact on standing.
Another critical source of U.S. standing in the global order relates to the nature of U.S. 
hegemony itself and America’s ability to provide public goods and leadership. The United 
States is not just a powerful country. After 1945, it became deeply involved in managing the 
international order in ways that promoted U.S. interests. Doing this successfully involved 
providing a range of public goods that benefited others: alliances, extended deterrence, 
security of the seas, multilateral peacekeeping and conflict resolution, nurturing a globalizing 
world economy by opening domestic markets, providing liquidity in times of crisis, and 
promoting free trade.33  
U.S. efforts in recent years that have provided public goods in humanitarian aid and 
global health have seen positive returns for the United States. For example, humanitarian 
aid in the wake of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami significantly improved favorable attitudes 
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towards the United States in Indonesia.34 And U.S. spending on AIDS and two other diseases, 
tuberculosis and malaria, primarily in Africa helps to explain that region’s distinctive positive 
attitude towards the United States. If the United States becomes unwilling or unable to 
provide these goods in the future, it is a safe bet that its standing and influence will both 
decline. 
As at the regional level, U.S. standing on the global stage appears susceptible to both 
vicious and virtuous cycles resulting in valleys and peaks, declines and advances. As credibility 
and esteem decline, the United States may be less able to lead and accomplish its policy goals. 
Others will be less willing to follow a U.S. lead or defer to U.S. opinions because they no longer 
believe the United States will get the job done, honor promises, or offer a desirable model to 
emulate. This, in turn, may further diminish U.S. standing. We see some evidence of this in 
the most recent period of diminished U.S. standing in global institutions. Logically, however, 
the converse ought to be true as well. As the United States is perceived to honor promises 
and show interest in multilateral leadership, its standing may be expected to increase, which 
may make expanded leadership, increased authority and cooperation possible. We suspect, 
however, that is harder to recover standing than to lose it.
Of course, there is at times a tension between being a team player and an effective 
provider of public goods or true leader. For example, U.S. support of the G20 as the hub of 
international economic rulemaking shows a willingness to cooperate with an increasingly 
diverse and inclusive group of countries. What is less clear is whether the U.S. can effectively 
lead and generate public goods for the system through the G20. In this situation, the United 
States gains in standing from being a team player—but if U.S. policy in the G20 is perceived as 
ineffective, the United States may ultimately lose in terms of credibility. 
 Conversely, leaders must sometimes take a lonely stand against the crowd—as the 
United States often does in supporting Israel at the United Nations. 
United States
America’s international standing depends not only on how the United States acts abroad, 
but also on what U.S. citizens think about America’s position in the world. What factors, 
international and domestic, shape Americans’ views of their country’s standing? Do America’s 
leaders worry about the nation’s international image, and if so, why? 
American Perceptions of Standing. Americans are currently unhappy about the 
country’s standing abroad. Despite high levels of confidence at home (and abroad) in Obama’s 
presidency, a February Gallup Poll shows that only 30 percent of the public is satisfied with 
the United States’ global position, roughly the same level 
that was recorded in 2008 when George W. Bush was still 
president. As Figure 6 indicates, public satisfaction with 
America’s standing has declined steadily since the United 
States invaded Iraq in 2003 and is now less than half the pre-war level. Public confidence in 
how the rest of the world sees the United States has followed a similar trajectory, declining 
from 75 percent who believed that the United States had a positive international image before 
the September 11 terrorist attacks to just 45 percent today. 35
Americans are currently unhappy 
about the country’s standing 
abroad. 
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Interestingly, the seeming uniformity of the trend masks a substantial divergence of 
partisan views on which aspects of standing are most important. For Republicans, standing seems 
to evoke hard power notions of “resolve,” which favor the credibility side of standing. Democrats 
appear to emphasize ideas that highlight esteem, like “legitimacy” and “moral standing.” 
This partisan gap is also apparent in public perceptions of U.S. standing, which widened 
considerably during Bush’s tenure. As Figure 7 indicates, both Republicans and Democrats 
believe that U.S. standing declined between 2002 and 2009. Dissatisfaction among Democrats 
increased sharply during the first term of the Bush presidency; Republican dissatisfaction 
surged during the second term. Yet Republicans and Democrats report very different 
satisfaction levels on standing. With the exception of the immediate post-September 11 period, 
during the Bush presidency, Democrats have been consistently less satisfied with America’s 
position in the world than have Republicans.
Partisan differences over America’s position in the world predate the controversies of 
the Bush presidency. And while the partisan gap has narrowed since mid-2008, it has not 
disappeared, nor is it likely to. This is because where Democrats and Republicans stand on 
American standing is shaped by which party controls the presidency. In Figure 7, Democratic 
satisfaction with U.S. standing was higher under Clinton. Now that a Democrat is in the 
White House, it is on the rise again. By contrast, Republican satisfaction rose when Bush 
assumed the presidency, and it has fallen under Obama. 
Source: Compiled from Gallup Surveys. See http://www.gallup.com/poll/104782/Discontent-US-Global-Position-Hits-Record-High.aspx#1 
and http://www.gallup.com/poll/115087/no-perceived-gains-world-standing-post-bush.aspx (accessed August 11, 2009).
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National Election Survey data from 
the Eisenhower through Bush years point to 
the same conclusion. As Figures 8a and 8b 
indicate, Democratic and Republican voters’ 
views of America’s position in the world 
(in terms of strength or weakness) vary 
depending on party control of the White House. Democrats are more sanguine about America’s 
position in the world when a Democrat is in the Oval Office. Republicans are more optimistic 
when their party is in charge of foreign policy. 
Significantly, this partisan polarization has soared since the end of the Cold War 
(Figure 9). Partisan differences over America’s global position averaged by presidency indicate 
new highs under Bill Clinton and George W. Bush.36  
Explaining the Partisan Gap. One factor in the increasing party rivalry in foreign 
policy is the end of the Cold War. The trend lines in Figures 8a and 8b are consistent with 
recent studies on the politics of U.S. foreign policy that show that between the early 1950s and 
the mid-1970s, the Cold War had a dampening effect on domestic partisan debate over foreign 
policy.37 Partisan politics certainly was very much alive during the era of bipolarity, but has 
intensified further since the collapse of the Soviet empire and the rise of the United States as 
the sole global superpower. 
Democratic and Republican voters’ views of 
America’s position in the world (in terms of 
strength or weakness) vary depending on party 
control of the White House. 
Source: Compiled from Gallup Surveys. See http://www.gallup.com/poll/104782/Discontent-US-Global-Position-Hits-Record-High.aspx#1 and 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/115087/no-perceived-gains-world-standing-post-bush.aspx (accessed August 11, 2009).
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International developments alone, however, do not fully account for these partisan 
divisions over U.S. standing. Some scholars have found that domestic ideologies—
conservative versus liberal—correlate with attitudes toward the use of diplomacy versus force 
in world affairs.38  Even more important, American “world views”—beliefs about national 
power, international legitimacy, and state sovereignty—do color judgments (especially, 
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Figure 8b:  Partisan Gap in Belief that U.S. Position in the World is Weaker
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Political changes at home have also taken their toll. Some of these changes have 
become part of the political system: e.g., the ideological homogenization of the two parties, 
the sorting of the electoral map into “Red” and “Blue” states, and the rise in income 
inequalities.40 Others are more contingent and reflect short-term political developments such 
as Bush’s strategy of playing to his electoral base and the Democrats’ use of the Iraq war in 
the 2006 midterm elections. 
Standing and Presidential Politics. Do changes in standing influence those who make 
foreign policy? As a first cut, any assessment of standing’s domestic impact should distinguish 
between elected and non-elected leaders. Scholars disagree about how much weight officials in 
the State Department or other governmental agencies attach to domestic or foreign publics’ 
views of U.S. standing. The same, however, cannot be said about presidents. Presidential scholars 
have long argued that U.S. standing abroad matters for presidential leadership.41  
Concerns about U.S. standing also mattered at home. In the 1960 presidential 
campaign, Kennedy and the Democrats exploited public concerns that the United States 
under Eisenhower was lagging behind the Soviet Union in missile production and space 
exploration—key indicators, Kennedy claimed, of international power and prestige.42 Ronald 
Reagan and the Republicans did much the same thing in 1980, when they criticized Jimmy 
Carter for compromising American power and standing—a view that a majority of the public 
came to share.43 And of course in the 2008 presidential campaign, both John McCain and 
Barack Obama pledged to restore America’s standing.44 
Obama’s efforts to make good on that pledge appear to be paying domestic political 
dividends. Though Americans remain largely dissatisfied with U.S. standing abroad (Figures 
Source: Based on National Election Survey data. See http://www.electionstudies.org/ (accessed August 11, 2009).
Figure 9:  The Widening Partisan Divide over U.S. Position in the World
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6 and 7), when asked in a Gallup Poll what was “the best thing” the president had done in his 
first one hundred days in office, the top answer given was improving the United States’ image 
in the world.45
Standing across Audiences
In the real world, of course, standing is not neatly separated into three discrete 
audiences. There are overlaps and clear mutual effects that work across the divides. Likewise, 
issues of standing and leadership show up in several audiences. Looking across the three 
audiences yields some provocative generalizations.
Mutual Effects. Opinion in regions and other countries should affect U.S. standing 
in international organizations, especially where governments represent popular opinion. 
Declining (rising) public support for the U.S. may make it easier for other governments 
to withhold (offer) support for U.S. positions in the UN and other global forums.46 More 
generally, a global society that is composed of the peoples of the world records its views in 
global polls about U.S. standing. It remains unclear, however, whether the recent recovery 
of “favorable views of the U.S.” in some countries will translate into greater support for the 
United States in the United Nations. 
 International standing often matters to presidents for reasons of domestic legitimacy. 
It might be fruitful to consider international standing as a domestic performance constraint 
influencing public judgments about presidential competence, much like quarterly GDP 
growth figures.47 As Figure 10 suggests, in 2004, Americans who were “satisfied” with 
America’s position in the world gave President Bush high job approval ratings; conversely, 
those who were “dissatisfied” with U.S. standing gave Bush low marks. Obviously, a 
president’s job approval depends on many factors, especially the economy. Still, it may be that 
international standing functions as a kind of proxy for presidential performance.
There exists the risk, though, that seeking improvements in foreign opinion could have 
domestic political costs. For example, today a clear majority in foreign opinion favors shutting 
down Guantanamo and withdrawing from Afghanistan. Majorities in the United States 
favor the opposite position.48 Boosting foreign support may fuel criticism that the President 
is ignoring opinion at home, similar to the way George H.W. Bush was criticized for ignoring 
domestic issues in favor of foreign affairs during the campaign of 1992.
Just as the country’s standing abroad can affect presidents’ ability to command 
domestic public support, standing at home can affect foreign policy and external opinion. 
A president’s domestic approval ratings or how Americans view standing can alter foreign 
leaders’ willingness to make concessions to the United States and thus shape the success of 
presidents in international negotiations. Moreover, how presidents handle crises at home can 
affect their standing abroad. The Bush administration’s handling of Hurricane Katrina had a 
negative impact on both the Bush presidency and the general U.S. image in the world.49
U.S. domestic politics and domestic institutions also shape how the United States 
is perceived globally. America’s founders deliberately designed the country’s governing 
institutions to divide power.50 This creates political frictions that Americans regard not only 
as inevitable but as desirable. U.S. presidents can promise abroad and cajole at home, but 
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sometimes checks by other branches of government will constrain their ability to deliver. 
Unavoidably, at times the United States will be perceived to be selfish or hypocritical or 
both—the outcome not of a deliberate policy as much as the consequence of a government 
of several independent parts and subject to electoral change. As noted above, the U.S. Senate 
rejected Clinton’s commitment to the CTBT and George W. Bush reversed Clinton’s earlier 
commitment to the Kyoto treaty. Bush championed the expansion of free trade but was 
limited in his ability to act when Congress failed to renew fast track authority in 2007.
Furthermore, the legal culture in the United States stresses the principle of pacta 
sunt servanda (“agreements must be kept”). Law has a political and cultural significance in 
American public life that makes it impossible for U.S. governments to simply sign treaties and 
agreements it has no intention of observing or upholding. This specific legal culture makes 
the United States appear at times more obstinate than other states with different and more 
permissive legal cultures. What is perceived by Americans as a strictly national matter has 
ramifications for America’s international image.
Leadership and Standing. Across the various global audiences and at home, high 
standing is essential for leadership. When U.S. standing is high, we should see more, and more 
effective, U.S. leadership in the world as well as noticeable effects on domestic politics. 
In international organizations, for example, leadership could take several forms, 
including agenda setting, rule reform, and institutional creation, all of which should be 
affected by standing. In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, when U.S. standing was 
Figure 10:  U.S. Standing Abroad and Presidential Approval at Home, 2004
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surging, the United States was successful in creating new institutions such as the WTO, and 
in getting existing institutions to engage in activities that suited its interests, such as UN 
peacekeeping and peace building activities. Since 1996, UN members are less likely to vote 
with the United States in the General Assembly.
Standing can also influence institutional creation and rule reform. Other states have 
tried to create new international institutions or rules without U.S. participation, sometimes 
successfully (the International Criminal Court, the Kyoto Protocol, the Mine Ban Treaty), 
sometimes less so (the Asian Monetary Fund). 
Similarly, in the international financial institutions, the Washington Consensus 
dominated the policies implemented by the IMF and World Bank immediately after the Cold 
War. During the Asian financial crisis, the United States had little difficulty in dictating 
terms to the affected countries in order for them to receive IMF loans51, and after the crisis, 
the United States was able to orchestrate the creation and codification of a new set of 
financial codes and standards with a minimum of fuss. This is in sharp contrast with the 
current financial crisis, where there has been pushback to the United States’ favored solution 
of government stimulated growth; other countries prefer more regulation of international 
financial practices and markets.52 
Since the mid-1990s the United States has taken few initiatives to reshape multilateral 
institutions or create new ones in response to emerging problems.53 It is not clear whether a 
loss in U.S. standing has caused the multilateral agenda to turn more negative or whether it 
was a lack of leadership that did so, perhaps also causing a loss in standing.54 
As already noted, standing and leadership are also relevant in domestic politics. 
Moreover, fluctuations in international standing shape public perceptions of foreign policy 
competence. Presidents deemed by the 
public to be incompetent Commanders-
in-Chief invariably experience some 
diminution in public support and their 
power as domestic agenda setters; examples include Woodrow Wilson over the League of 
Nations; Jimmy Carter over the hostage crisis in Iran; George W. Bush over Iraq. If these 
presidents seek reelection, they can expect the party-out-of-power to make foreign policy, and 
America’s international position in particular, a campaign issue. 
Cross-Audience Conjectures. Looking across audiences, one of our most striking 
conjectures is the consistency in the distinction between the two main aspects of standing, 
credibility and esteem. It is apparent not only in the abstract conceptual discussion but also 
in the different notions of standing held by elites and mass publics in different regions and 
countries, and between Republicans and Democrats in the United States. 
For example, at the outset of the 1960s, American Democrats criticized President 
Eisenhower for his apparent lack of concern over issues of prestige in the unfolding space 
race and the competition for “hearts and minds” in the developing world. Forty years later, 
Democrats instead highlighted issues of legitimacy in challenging a very different Republican 
president. At the outset of the Pershing missile debate of the late 1970s, under President 
Carter, U.S. credibility was in question. A few years later, under President Reagan, the 
Fluctuations in international standing shape 
public perceptions of foreign policy competence. 
 Task Force on U.S. Standing in World Affairs 23
pendulum had swung the other way; it was esteem that some felt was lacking.55 Notably, these 
debates were not just about U.S. capabilities or goals, but instead about how those relate to 
U.S. credibility and esteem.
Secondly, standing’s meaning varies across space and time. During the Cold War, U.S. 
standing varied greatly among the Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of China, and Third 
World governments. Today, U.S. standing differs significantly among Muslims in West Africa, 
the Gulf region and Southeast Asia; among West and East Europeans; and even among 
Canadians and Mexicans. 
A third conjecture is the possible resonance of Republican and Democratic notions of 
standing in different regions of the world. Today, Democrats’ concerns about esteem parallel 
Europe’s priorities, while Republicans’ worries about credibility seem closer to views echoed 
in East Asia. However, this is less clear for the other regions: because of the deep split in the 
Middle East between elites (who appear to share Republican notions of standing) and mass 
publics (who share Democratic notions of standing); because of the possible conflation of 
the United States playing the role of both global and regional power in Latin America; and 
because of the lack of heavy American footprints in Africa. 
A fourth conjecture is the potential importance of transnational political coalitions. 
When like-minded governments come to power (Reagan, Thatcher, Kohl in the early 1980s; 
Clinton, Blair, Schröder in the mid- to late 1990s), American standing receives a boost.56 
The election of conservative governments in Germany (Merkel, 2005) and France (Sarkozy, 
2007) was seen by some as an indicator that the decline in U.S. standing in Europe during 
the second Bush administration was finally at an end.57 The evidence on this point remains, 
however, decidedly mixed, since other indicators showed a continuing slide (See Figure 3).
A final conjecture links standing, partisan politics, and transatlantic relations. U.S. 
standing in Europe has sometimes plunged in periods when the United States has taken 
assertive action that threatened an escalating war. Moreover, this has often involved intense 
partisan conflict at home. For example, the “second” Cold War during the first half of the 
1980s did not mute partisan differences as the “first” Cold War had done; rather, it sharpened 
them. Reagan’s rearmament policy, tough rhetoric, and changes in U.S. war fighting doctrines 
actually raised the specter of nuclear war in Europe, encouraged the rise of a powerful 
European peace movement, and initially produced lower U.S. standing. Ultimately, Reagan’s 
perceived success in ending the Cold War caused a surge in American standing in his second 
term and into George H. W. Bush’s first term (see Figure 2). To date, the virulent reaction 
to the security policy of George W. Bush’s administration mirrored the first part of that 
experience in Europe as well as in the United States. 
III. Standing and the Future of U.S. Foreign Policy
T he dynamics of U.S. standing are complex, and we grasp only imperfectly the sources and impact of U.S. credibility and esteem in the world. Yet standing is a matter of 
consequence for U.S. foreign policy, and American leaders must pay attention to standing in 
making policy. What follows distills five lessons for the role and management of standing in 
America’s foreign relations.
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1. Factor standing into national interest 
Standing should never be the sole consideration behind U.S. foreign policy. There will 
inevitably be trade-offs between other pressing interests in particular situations; for example, 
the United States may need to act to protect itself from an imminent threat, and this action 
may diminish its standing among some audiences. 
It is important, however, to acknowledge more explicitly the costs and benefits of 
maintaining standing in policymaking. For decision makers under pressure, it is tempting 
to focus only on what is concrete and immediate and has short-term impact. But just as it is 
dangerous for business leaders to focus only on quarterly profits and ignore their firm’s long-
term health, so too must U.S. leaders consider the nation’s stock of credibility and esteem. 
U.S. standing is a form of political capital 
akin to what accountants call “good will” that 
is mostly consequential over the long term 
and affects other nations’ willingness to offer 
it the “benefit of the doubt.” Moreover, U.S. 
credibility and esteem help to mold Americans’ 
sense of unity and collective purpose. Standing is easy to neglect, but wise policymakers 
should consider its impact and sometimes protect it even when there are short-term costs.58
2. Use different tools for different jobs
As seen above, how others think about standing varies across regions and even between 
foreign elites and mass publics. Inevitably there will be trade-offs. For example, attempting to 
boost the U.S. image with elites in the Middle East may involve demonstrations of credibility 
that transgress values important to regional publics. Arab leaders may respect U.S. loyalty to 
Israel, which is anathema to Arab publics. U.S. support of a loyal ally such as Mubarak may 
seem like a contradiction of the support for human rights favored by Egyptian citizens. To 
maintain its standing among these two constituencies, the United States must thread the 
needle, serving relatively narrow interests while also supporting broad moral objectives.
Similarly, credibility and esteem are both aspects of standing. Yet different actions 
may be needed to boost one or the other, and at times policies focused on improving one 
may involve costs to the other. President Kennedy ended a moratorium on nuclear tests and 
approved the use of napalm in Viet Nam in order to boost U.S. credibility in the world. Doing 
so, however, had negative effects on U.S. esteem.59 
Likewise, it might be wise to focus on certain aspects with specific countries or at 
particular times. Dealing with North Korea may demand more attention to credibility than 
to esteem. Following a period where credibility is the major emphasis, as was the case in the 
George W. Bush administration, esteem may deserve special attention, and after a period 
where credibility has been less favored, as during Clinton’s first term, credibility may deserve 
more weight. In actions on Guantanamo and in speeches aimed at the Muslim world, the 
Obama administration to date has increased attention to esteem. 
U.S. foreign policy will not always be able to maximize American standing, but it will do 
a better job by recognizing that different tools are suited to particular jobs.
U.S. standing is a form of political capital akin 
to what accountants call “good will” that is 
mostly consequential over the long term and 
affects other nations’ willingness to offer it the 
“benefit of the doubt.”
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3. Heed the bond between power and standing
While standing is not a simple reflection of American capabilities and relative power in the 
world, a mutual influence exists. Enduring changes in U.S. economic and military capabilities 
are likely to change standing, even as standing can enhance or diminish capabilities that do 
exist. In a relative sense, the presence of competitors with sufficient power to threaten other 
countries can enhance U.S. standing with those same countries.
 U.S. leaders can also use capabilities to provide public goods and maintain the alliances 
that importantly affect U.S. standing in the world. This is not charity. Such efforts should be 
specifically directed at parts of the international system that work in America’s as well as the 
world’s interests. The United States should exercise leadership by coordinating the actions 
of other capable states, sharing with them 
the task of designing policies and the costs of 
carrying them out. Although the benefits—and 
accompanying expectations—should not be 
oversold, such efforts add to U.S. standing, 
and U.S. standing in turn makes it easier to 
wield power and ask for burden sharing.
4. Move beyond public diplomacy
The decline in U.S. standing has led to a wave of reports about how to upgrade and improve 
U.S. public diplomacy.60 While public diplomacy can be improved, it should not be the only 
approach to standing. During the Cold War, U.S. public diplomacy organizations like USIA 
worked best when they disseminated factual information and objective news. Deliberate 
spinning of the news, of the kind now perfected in electoral campaigns and in recent years 
imitated by the U.S. government, is received with suspicion or outright disbelief in many 
countries where U.S. standing has plummeted. The creation of a new major government 
organization, department, or government-controlled entity would be challenged by high levels 
of suspicion and disbelief that now prevail in several regions and many countries. 
To be sure, more resources must go to a broader definition of public diplomacy. As 
seen above, public goods are a particularly important category. There has, however, been an 
imbalance in the types of public goods the U.S. provides. The United States will spend more 
than 600 billion dollars for defense in 2010-11, ten times the amount for diplomacy and 
foreign assistance—and this even after the Obama administration had sharply reversed the 
budgetary priorities of the U.S. government. There is no doubt that the U.S. military is one of 
the key providers of the United States’ most important international role—i.e., the guarantor 
of general stability and freedom of the seas, commerce, and travel. That role enhances 
U.S. credibility and perhaps esteem as well. Greater funding for other types of diplomacy, 
however—e.g., humanitarian aid, social services in fractured nations—would, if effective (a 
major caveat), enhance credibility and esteem as well, and perhaps at better value. Moreover, 
many argue, greater investments in these areas might reduce the likelihood of instability and 
conflict that require U.S. military intervention.
Going beyond the world of states, we are also seeing a shift to a more pluralist, complex 
global network of intersecting exchanges. This shift provides opportunities to enhance 
The United States should exercise leadership 
by coordinating the actions of other capable 
states, sharing with them the task of designing 
policies and the costs of carrying them out.
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America’s standing. Global electronic chat rooms, business organizations eager to rebrand 
themselves, thousands of NGOs that work across borders, private diplomacy (conducted by 
rock stars, corporate executives, foundation heads, and ex-presidents) are by now rivaling in 
size the foreign aid expenditures of major states. Furthermore, innumerable electronic, audio, 
and print media outlets, hundreds of thousands of foreign students, the dreamscapes of 
Hollywood movies, and American Idols all have an effect on standing that is significant even 
though it cannot be measured readily. The United States needs to consider how it nurtures 
these efforts without dictating their content. One idea would be to rework the tax code so that 
it enhances and encourages international activity that earns good will.
5. Support data collection and analysis on standing
As indicated above and in the appendix, we need to gather more information to better 
understand this vital aspect of U.S. foreign policy. Most specifically, the United State does 
not collect reliable indicators on the different facets of standing (esteem and credibility) for 
different audiences (elites vs. mass publics) abroad and at home. 
The data collection efforts by the U.S. government and private organizations have been 
sporadic, prompted by headline-grabbing events and crises. This is true of all world regions, 
with the exception of Europe, where some survey data are available for selected years since the 
1950s.61 Even for the U.S. public, we lack consistent questions over time. The United States 
supports periodic National Election Surveys at home. Questions involving U.S. standing 
should be added to this survey.
A comparable effort should be made to encourage private polling organizations to 
include questions about standing in their global polls and to develop metrics other than 
survey data that capture the standing of the United States. To the extent that systematic 
data exist, they are in recent years centered almost exclusively on public opinion surveys—an 
important but far-from-perfect indicator of standing. Modest public funds should also be 
directed to other types of data collection (for example foreign media analysis, collection 
of statistics on cultural exports like films or the impact of U.S. legal precedents) to rectify 
this problem, and to encourage broader research programs that illuminate a foundational 
component of U.S. influence in world affairs.
Conclusion
T he United States would be well served by nurturing credibility and esteem, twin foundations of how the world regards the United States. Standing is far from the only 
concern in, or source of, U.S. foreign policy, yet it remains a touchstone in formulating a 
wise, long-term American approach to the world.
Moreover, U.S. standing is a marker of self assessment—part and parcel of who 
Americans are and what we do. Our collective sense of self—our goals, values, interests, and 
dreams—helps to shape expectations that lead to judgments of our actions and form the 
basis of respect and loathing, appeal and repulsion. In turn, those sentiments in foreign 
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lands, international organizations, and 
American voting booths can enhance or 
constrain U.S. diplomacy and provide a 
mirror to Americans. 
There is much we do not know about standing and more we need to explore. What we do 
know is that standing is a complicated element of America’s foreign relations, and it deserves 
more rigorous study. We have included possible questions for future research in the appendix. 
It is our hope that a better understanding of standing will give decision-makers the tools they 
need to manage this asset wisely in the U.S. policymaking process. 
U.S. standing is a marker of self assessment — part 
and parcel of who Americans are and what we do. 
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Dissenting Views
O ur caveats with the report, which is in every way an exemplary product of intellectual collegiality and good will, are three-fold.
First, as this report suggests, what Americans think about US standing is heavily 
influenced by whether one is Republican or Democrat. When Republicans hold the presidency, 
Democrats become progressively more dissatisfied with US standing than Republicans do. 
The opposite holds true when Democrats hold the presidency. This pattern has prevailed since 
the 1950s. 
In light of this pattern, this report makes too much of the recent decline of US standing, 
implicitly indicting the administration of George W. Bush and endorsing President Obama’s 
rhetoric to “restore” that standing. This point of view is certainly popular and defensible—one 
could even say confirmed by the elections. But we would have preferred a disclaimer much 
earlier in the report warning the reader to be aware that political bias affects perceptions of 
standing. The academic community, unbalanced as it is between self-identified Republicans 
and Democrats, is not immune to such bias.
Second, just as US standing is heavily influenced by political bias in the United States, 
it is equally influenced by political dispositions in foreign countries. At least some, perhaps a 
good deal, of the dissatisfaction with US standing around the world has nothing to do with 
US esteem and credibility. It has more to 
do with the politics and foreign policies 
of those countries themselves, or with the 
attitudes of groups within them. 
As the report suggests, dissatisfaction with US standing is highest in the Middle East 
and Europe. However, European views of the United States as clumsy, warlike, and uncultured 
begin in the 19th century, and European criticisms today reflect European attitudes about 
the use of force, which are reflected in and reinforced by weaknesses in military power as 
much as by doubts about US esteem. In the Middle East, poll respondents are unhappy about 
many local things—ethnic and sectarian conflicts, government oppression, lack of economic 
opportunity, Arab-Israeli and other regional (Iran-Iraq) disputes, and so on. Much of this 
unhappiness gets displaced onto the United States and would register just as strongly against 
European powers, Russia, or China if they wielded the preeminent power the United States 
has today, regardless of the policies they might pursue. 
The report notes the declining level of support in the United Nations for the United 
States and points to factors that have increased or decreased the percentage of countries 
voting with the US at particular 
moments. The most striking thing about 
the data, however, is that support for 
the United States has declined, with some ups and downs, since the 1950s. Republican or 
Democratic, unilateral or multilateral, support for the US just keeps going down. This 
At least some, perhaps a good deal, of the 
dissatisfaction with US standing around the world 
has nothing to do with US esteem and credibility.
Republican or Democratic, unilateral or multi-
lateral, support for the US just keeps going down. 
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result may have as much to do with the dynamics of the UN itself as with US credibility 
and esteem.
Third, it is not clear that standing has independent consequences for effective 
diplomacy. Our colleagues have argued that standing involves both credibility and esteem. 
As they recognize, these two factors are not easily aggregated, do not have the same sources, 
and can go in different directions. We believe that credibility matters. Credibility is based 
on power and past performance, not on sentiments about the United States. The impact of 
esteem is far less evident. Obama has raised American esteem but has not produced more 
European troops for Afghanistan, secured concessions from North Korea, or made any 
headway with Iran. 
Conversely, in the early 1980s President Reagan incurred sharp drops in US standing to 
expand dramatically US defense capabilities, challenge the Soviets to an arms race they could 
not win, and prod NATO to deploy intermediate range nuclear missiles in Europe. The report 
highlights these policies as evidence that standing matters in terms other than capabilities 
or power. But in fact, the low standing of these policies mattered not at all. As one Soviet 
official at the time later testified, these policies had a significant impact on Moscow and 
contributed to ending the Cold War: “Reagan’s course in the early 1980s sent a clear signal to 
Gorbachev and his associates of the dangerous and counterproductive nature of the Soviet 
Union’s further expansion, which was overstretching its resources, aggravating tensions, 
and provoking hostile reactions across the globe.”62 Similarly, George W. Bush undertook a 
military surge in Iraq at a time when his own domestic and US world standing were at an 
all-time low. However one feels about the Iraq war, US policy in Iraq is much better off today 
because that surge and other policies succeeded.  
Stephen D. Krasner and Henry R. Nau
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Appendix 
Suggested Questions for Further Research
Conceptual  ___________________________________________________
What is the nature of the relationship between credibility and esteem? Do they 
vary together? 
What is the relationship of unilateralism and multilateralism to standing, 
credibility, and esteem? 
How does the possession and use of hard power affect various components of 
standing?
Regions  ______________________________________________________
How do the foreign media, press, and the Internet shape views of standing?
How do views of America affect how foreign citizens think about their own 
government and society? 
What is the standing of other countries in world affairs? How does that standing 
compare to the United States in terms of sources and impact?
Do other countries (such as the Nordic countries and Canada/China and Russia) 
have standing in international forums that exceeds/falls short of their material 
power? Why and to what effect? 
Have other countries suffered from challenging or violating the system of 
international rules and law? For example, France did not sign the NPT until 
1992, would not sign the Limited Test Ban Treaty, and held fifty atmospheric tests 
in the South Pacific from the mid-60s through the mid-70s. France also withdrew 
from NATO. Did it suffer a loss in standing as a result? 
International Organizations  ____________________________________
How does U.S. standing relate to global governance? 
How will standing affect and be affected by current changes in international 
economic rules and institutions? 
How does diplomacy affect standing? Do things like demonstrating respect for 
others, listening, and so on make a difference?
Does the U.S. participate in fewer or more international agreements than other 
countries? Is the nature of these agreements unique? How do they affect standing? 
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Appendix, cont’d 
United States  _________________________________________________
How is U.S. standing affected by the personal standing of the president? Is 
executive standing a third dimension in addition to credibility and esteem?
Do politicians worry more about U.S. standing if they represent large immigrant 
populations? 
Is the process of making foreign policy more vulnerable to politicization and 
electoral gamesmanship when the public believes U.S. standing is weakening or 
when it is strengthening?
Do presidents reap positive domestic spillover effects from upswings in U.S. 
international standing that occur on their watch?
When presidents consciously take steps to change U.S. standing abroad (through 
repayment of UN dues, support for international treaties, etc.), what are the 
consequences for their political power at home?
How have presidents used the issue of standing abroad to make the case for policies 
at home? 
How do Americans with different world views or partisan loyalties differ in their 
opinion of the relative role in world affairs of democracy/culture, force/diplomacy, 
confrontation/cooperation, unilateralism/multilateralism, and so on? 
32 APSA   •   US Standing in the World: Causes, Consequences, and the Future
1. See “Troubled by Loss of Standing in the World, Americans Support Major Foreign Policy Changes,” The Chicago Council 
on Global Affairs, September 2008. http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/UserFiles/File/POS_Topline%20Reports/POS%20
2008/2008%20Public%20Opinion_Foreign%20Policy.pdf (accessed June 9, 2009). In January 2009, a BBC poll indicated 
that “improving U.S. relations with the rest of the world” remained a high priority goal for Americans – even as solving 
the financial crisis became the issue of greatest concern. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/19_01_09_obam-
apoll.report.pdf (accessed June 9, 2009).
2. Steven Kull, Clay Ramsay, Stephen Weber, and Evan Lewis, “America’s Global Image in the Obama Era,” World Public Opin-
ion.Org, July 7, 2009. http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/jul09/WPO_USObama_Jul09_packet.pdf (accessed 
July 9, 2009); Pew Global Attitudes Project, “Confidence in Obama Lifts U.S. Image around the World.” Released July 23, 
2009, http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=264 (accessed July 23, 2009).
3. Similarly, standing can remain constant while military and economic power rise or fall. China retains relatively modest 
standing today even as its capabilities soar. 
4. On prestige, see Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983) and the 
related issue of honor; see Barry O’Neill, Honor, Symbols and War (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999). On 
reputation, see Jonathan Mercer, Reputation in International Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996); Michael 
Tomz, Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 2007); James E. Alt, Randall L. Calvert and Brian D. Humes, “Reputation and Hegemonic Stability: A Game-The-
oretic Analysis,” American Political Science Review 82 (1988); Dale Copeland, “Do Reputations Matter?” Security Studies 7 
(1997); George W. Downs and Michael A. Jones, “Reputation, Compliance, and International Law,” Journal of Legal Studies 
XXXI (2002); Gregory D. Miller, “Hypotheses on Reputation: Alliance Choices and the Shadow of the Past,” Security Studies 
12 (2003); Shiping Tang, “Reputation, Cult of Reputation, and International Conflict,” Security Studies 14 (2005); Barbara 
F. Walter, “Building Reputation: Why Governments Fight Some Separatists but Not Others,” American Journal of Political 
Science 50 (2006); Mark J. C. Crescenzi, “Reputation and Interstate Conflict,” American Journal of Political Science 51 (2007). 
On credibility specifically, see Daryl Press, Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell 
University Press, 2005); Anne Sartori, Deterrence by Diplomacy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2007); Randall 
Stone, Lending Credibility: The International Monetary Fund and Post-Communist Transitions (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 2002). On moral stature and legitimacy, see Ian Hurd, After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United 
States Security Council (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2007); Thomas Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among 
Nations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Thomas Risse-Kappen, Cooperation among Democracies: The European 
Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997); Christopher Gelpi, The Power of Legiti-
macy: Assessing the Role of Norms in Crisis Bargaining (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002); Mlada Bukovan-
sky, Legitimacy and Power Politics: The American and French Revolutions in International Political Culture (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 2002); Christian Reus-Smit, American Power and World Order (New York: Polity Press, 2004); 
Ian Clark, Legitimacy in International Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); Katharina P. Coleman, Interna-
tional Organizations and Peace Enforcement: The Politics of International Legitimacy (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007); Ian Hurd, “Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics,” International Organization 53 (1999); Michael 
Barnett, “Bringing in the New World Order: Liberalism, Legitimacy, and the United Nations,” World Politics 49 (1995); 
Rodney Bruce Hall, “Moral Authority as a Power Resource,” International Organization 51 (1997); David M. Edelstein, 
“Might Makes Right? Rethinking Legitimacy and the Use of Force,” Mortar Center for International Studies Working 
Paper (2005); Stacie E. Goddard, “Uncommon Ground: Indivisible Territory and the Politics of Legitimacy,” International 
Organization 60 (2006); Shirley V. Scott and Olivia Ambler, “Does Legality Really Matter? Accounting for the Decline in 
US Legitimacy Following the 2003 Invasion of Iraq,” European Journal of International Relations 13 (2007). On authority, 
see David Lake, Hierarchy in International Relations (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2009); Rodney Bruce Hall and 
Thomas J. Biersteker, eds., The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002); Nicholas Onuf and Frank F. Klink, “Anarchy, Authority, and Rule,” International Studies Quarterly 33 (1989); 
Claire A. Cutler, “Locating ‘Authority’ in the Global Political Economy,” International Studies Quarterly 43 (1999). 
5. Colin Powell, “The Craft of Diplomacy,” Wilson Quarterly 28:3 (Summer 2004), 60-67, reprinted in Eugene R. Wittkopf and 
James M. McCormick, eds., The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence, 5th ed. (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 2008), p. 216. http://books.google.com/books?id=CwN6RATLAk0C&pg=PA213&lpg=PA213&d
q=colin+powell+%22craft+of+diplomacy%22+text&source=bl&ots=ARPQTA-LZe&sig=WTeM3J0vU1rn5KWwr3l2gTp-
3N4&hl=en&ei=V6QuSu7XDpGMNZDWmPwJ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1#PPR8,M1 (accessed June 9, 
2009).
6. Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), p. x.
7. Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary, http://mw1.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/anti%20americanism (accessed 
June 6, 2009); Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Anti-Americanisms in World Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell 
University Press, 2007).
Endnotes
 Task Force on U.S. Standing in World Affairs 33
8. Discussions of legitimacy parallel standing. Legitimacy is defined in two ways: substance and process. Substance defini-
tions align more easily with the credibility dimension of standing; process definitions relate to esteem. These are admit-
tedly porous boundaries.
9. See, for example, Mike Allen and Romesh Ratnesar, “The End of Cowboy Diplomacy,” Time, July 9, 2006, www.time.com/
time/magazine/article/0,9171,1211578,00.html (accessed April 9, 2009); and Philip H. Gordon, “The End of the Bush 
Revolution,” Foreign Affairs (July/August 2006): 75-86. 
10. As Lyndon Johnson explained to Martin Luther King, Jr. in early 1965, “If I pulled out [of Vietnam], I think our commit-
ments would be no good anywhere. I think that we’d immediately trigger a situation in Thailand that would be just as 
bad as it is in Vietnam. I think we’d be right back to the Philippines with problems. I think the Germans would be scared 
to death that our commitment to them was no good, and God knows what we’d have in other places in the world …..” 
Melvyn P. Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union and the Cold War (New York: Hill and Wang, 
2007), p. 220.
11. As historian Mark Haefele notes, “Under Kennedy, the USIA embarked on a systematic effort to measure world sentiment 
‘about the U.S. and major international issues.’” See his “John F. Kennedy, USIA, and World Public Opinion,” Diplomatic 
History 25 (Winter 2001): 63. 
12. See Mary Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 2000).
13. Carter was particularly concerned about U.S. standing in Latin America and viewed the treaty as a means for improving 
America’s image in the region. On the politics of the treaty’s ratification, see Adam Clymer, Drawing the Line at the Big 
Ditch: The Panama Canal Treaties and the Rise of the Right (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2008).
14. February 12, 2009: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence: Statement for the Record by Dennis C. Blair, Director of Na-
tional Intelligence - Annual Threat Assessment Hearing. http://www.dni.gov/testimonies.htm (accessed March 26, 2009).
15. There are validity issues with opinion polling, especially in non-democratic countries. See, for example, Timur Kuran, Pri-
vate Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997).
16. Pew Global Attitudes Project, “Confidence in Obama Lifts U.S. Image around the World.” Released July 23, 2009, e.g., p. 6, 
http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=264 (accessed July 23, 2009).
17. Long-term trend data on public assessments of the United States exist only for Europe. The data show a more dramatic 
collapse after 2002 than at any time since the early 1950s. See Pierangelo Isernia, “ Anti-Americanism in Europe during 
the Cold War,” in Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Anti-Americanisms in World Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell 
University Press, 2007), pp. 75-79. The unavailability of survey data reflects the sporadic American interest in the subject. 
Data tend to be available only for times of crisis such as the early 1980s or the years after 2002. 
18. In view of the conceptual distinctions between standing and related concepts such as hard and soft power, anti-Ameri-
canism and legitimacy, the unavailability of systematic regional data is regrettable. This report relies in its assessment of 
regional variation primarily on the judgments of its task force members. 
 19. “Views of Russia and China Decline in Global Poll,” BBC World Service Poll, February 6, 2009. http://www.worldpubli-
copinion.org/pipa/pdf/feb09/BBCEvals_Feb09_rpt.pdf (accessed April 10, 2009); Pew Global Attitudes Project, “Con-
fidence in Obama Lifts U.S. Image around the World,” Released July 23, 2009, esp. pp. 24, 43-49, http://pewglobal.org/
reports/display.php?ReportID=264 (accessed July 23, 2009). For a report that suggests that the EU may be a viable – if 
still lagging – alternative to the United States, see GARNET Working Paper No. 62/09, ”Research Report: The External 
Image of the European Union - Phase Two,” Sonia Lucarelli, Lorenzo Fioramonti (ed.), http://www.garnet-eu.org/Work-
ing_Papers.27.0.html (accessed May 6, 2009).
20. Anthony Faiola, “Fading of the Dollar’s Dominance,” Washington Post, June 24, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/23/AR2009062303397.html (accessed July 1, 2009); Liu Li, “Beijing Formalizes Call for 
New Reserve Currency,” The Wall Street Journal, June 29, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124616719675965215.
html (accessed July 1, 2009).
21. Jeffrey T. Checkel and Peter J. Katzenstein, eds., European Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
22. Giacomo Chiozza, Anti-Americanism and the American World Order (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009).
23. Admittedly, there exist deep disagreements within and between regions about what constitutes a public good. Secur-
ing an unrestricted flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz is considered a vital public good in Europe and Asia but not 
in the Middle East, where overwhelming majorities consider this an unwarranted foreign intervention in regional affairs.
24. Carol Atkinson, “Does Soft Power Matter? A Comparative Analysis of Student Exchange Programs 1980-2004,” Working 
Paper, Vanderbilt University (2008), shows that there is no correlation between the influx of international students in the 
U.S. and improvements in human rights practices, while there is a positive correlation between respect of human rights 
and involvement in professional military educational programs. See also Carol Atkinson, “Constructivist Implications 
of Material Power: Military Engagement and the Socialization of States 1972-2000,” International Studies Quarterly 50 
(2006): 509-537.
34 APSA   •   US Standing in the World: Causes, Consequences, and the Future
25. If all states in a regional grouping voted with the U.S. on all votes, the index of agreement would be 1; if they never 
voted with the U.S., the index would be 0. An abstention when the U.S. votes yes or no is counted as .5 agreement. The 
data for 1964 is the mean between 1963 and 1964, as there was only one vote in 1964. The actual data are based on 
sessions, rather than years. The sessions generally run in a three-month period between September and December 
but sometimes continue into the following calendar year. Caribbean and Pacific Islands are omitted from the graph to 
enhance clarity.
26. Press freedom index by Reporters without Borders, http://www.rsf.org/en-classement794-2008.html (accessed June 9, 
2009).  
U.S. Press Freedom Index Ranking
Year Rank
2002 17
2003 31 US singled out with Israel for actions against journalists outside its borders (Iraq)
2004 22 with Belgium
2005 44 Drop attributed to Judith Miller arrest
2006 53
2007 48 Israel is 44, and it has a military censor
2008 36 With Bosnia, South Africa, Spain, and Taiwan
Source: Reporters Without Borders
27. The U.S. is virtually alone in not having ratified the Kyoto Protocol.
28. These data are from the United Nations Treaty Series and include original agreements only.
29. Interestingly, extensive U.S. compliance with its many bilateral obligations tends to go unnoticed. In fact, the United 
States is party to over ten thousand international agreements, and there is no trend in treaty disputes brought against 
it. Detlev F. Vagts, “The U.S. and Its Treaties: Observance and Breach,” The American Journal of International Law, 95:2 (April 
2001): 313-334.
30. In discussing the U.S. use of torture (contra the Geneva conventions) in the Bush Administration, Philip Zelikow, a coun-
selor to Secretary of State Rice, noted another cost: “the help you lose because your friends start keeping their distance. 
When I worked at the State Department, some of America’s best European allies found it increasingly difficult to assist 
us in counterterrorism because they feared becoming complicit in a program their governments abhorred. This was not 
a hypothetical concern.” See Philip Zelikow, “Confronting America’s Recent Past,” New York Times, April 24, 2009, http://
www.nytimes.com/2009/04/25/opinion/25iht-edlet.html?hpw (accessed April 24, 2009).
31. George H.W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Knopf, 1998), pp. 399-400. Also see Bush’s 
September 11, 1990 “Address before a Joint Session of Congress,” which uses the phrase “new world order.” Available 
through the University of Virginia’s Miller Center for Public Affairs website (Scripps Library) at http://millercenter.org/
scripps/archive/speeches/detail/3425. 
32. President Clinton signed the ICC treaty but  thought the final version was flawed and also opposed ratifying it. See “Bad 
Treaty: Senate Approval Would Leave U.S. Open to False Charges,” Houston Chronicle, January 6, 2001, A34. http://www.
chron.com/CDA/archives/archive.mpl?id=2001_3271883 (accessed August 3, 2009).
33. Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983); Robert O. Keohane, After He-
gemony (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984); G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, 
and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999).
34. See Ed Pound, “Indonesians Turn Supportive of United States,” U.S. News & World Report 2/23/06, http://www.usnews.
com/usnews/news/articles/060223/23indonesia.htm (accessed 6/30/09).
35. See Jeffrey M. Jones, “No Perceived Gains in U.S. World Standing Post-Bush,” February 18, 2009, http://www.gallup.com/
poll/115087/No-Perceived-Gains-World-Standing-Post-Bush.aspx (accessed June 9, 2009); “Obama Rockets to Top of Poll 
on Global Leaders,” WorldPublicOpinion.Org, June 29, 2009, http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/views_
on_countriesregions_bt/618.php?nid=&id=&pnt=618&lb (accessed July 1, 2009). 
36. Data were not available for years during the Kennedy, Nixon, Ford, and Carter presidencies.
37. See Charles A. Kupchan and Peter L. Trubowitz, “Dead Center: The Demise of Liberal Internationalism in the United 
States,” International Security 32 (Fall 2007): 7-44.
38. See Ole R. Holsti, Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), chap. 4. 
39. Matthew A. Baum and Henry R. Nau, “Foreign Policy Views and U.S. Standing in the World,” paper for 2009 Annual Meet-
ing of the American Political Science Association, Toronto, Canada, September 2009.
 Task Force on U.S. Standing in World Affairs 35
40. On these structural trends, see Alan A. Abramowitz and Kyle L. Saunders, “Ideological Realignment in the U.S. Electorate,” 
Journal of Politics 60 (1998): 634-52; Earl Black and Merle Black, Divided America: The Ferocious Power Struggle in Ameri-
can Politics (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2007); and Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal, Polarized 
America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2006). For a survey of what is now a vast 
literature on this topic, see Geoffrey C. Layman, Thomas M. Carsey, and Juliana Menasce Horowitz, “Party Polarization in 
American Politics: Characteristics, Causes, and Consequences,” Annual Review of Political Science 9 (2006): 86-110.
41. See, for example, Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960), 
pp. 4-9; and Richard Rose, The Postmodern President, 2nd. ed. (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House Publishers, 1991), pp. 
37-45.
42. On Kennedy’s 1960 campaign strategy, see Lawrence R. Jacobs and Robert Y. Shapiro, “Issues, Candidate Image, and 
Priming: The Use of Private Polls in Kennedy’s 1960 Presidential Campaign,” American Political Science Review 88 (Sep-
tember 1994): 527-40. On the role of foreign policy in the 1960 campaign, see Robert A. Divine, Foreign Policy and U.S. 
Presidential Elections, 1952-1960 (New York: New Viewpoints, 1974).
43. On the public mood in the late 1970s and early 1980s, see Daniel Yankelovich and Larry Kagan, “Assertive America,” 
Foreign Affairs 59 (Winter 1981): 696-713.
44. Obama was not alone. John McCain also pledged to restore U.S. international standing. However, almost half of all 
voters thought McCain would continue Bush policies, while some 90 percent of that group favored Obama. See “Inside 
Obama’s Sweeping Victory,” http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1023/exit-poll-analysis-2008 (accessed June 9, 2009). One of 
the principles of the Obama campaign was  “that people were embarrassed by the decline in America’s standing in the 
eyes of the world and that that would have political relevance to voters who normally might not care that much about 
foreign policy.” Dan Balz and Haynes Johnson, “A Political Odyssey: How Obama’s Team Forged a Path That Surprised 
Everyone, Even the Candidate,” Washington Post, August 2, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2009/07/31/AR2009073101582.html?hpid%3Dtopnews&sub=AR (accessed August 2, 2009).
45. http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2009-04-23-obama-poll_N.htm (accessed June 9, 2009).
46. The limited data on this is not clear cut. For example, there is no long term decline in the opinion data for Western 
Europe in Figure 2 that clearly maps on to the downward trend in the UN in Figure 5.
47. Presidential competence in foreign affairs depends on many things – ability to keep ends and means in balance, skill at 
managing foreign crises, and success in winning international consent or deference to American-led initiatives.
48. Pew Global Attitudes Project, “Confidence in Obama Lifts U.S. Image around the World,” Released July 23, 2009, esp. pp. 
5, 22-23, http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=264 (accessed July 23, 2009).
49. For examples, see http://www.publicdiplomacy.org/53.htm (accessed April 22, 2009).
50. The institution of judicial review limits executive and legislative powers. In addition, the executive branch of govern-
ment, including the president, is bound by Congressional oversight over important treaties and budgetary matters.
51. Paul Blustein, The Chastening (Washington: Public Affairs, 2001).
52. Daniel Drezner, All Politics Is Global (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2007); Mark Landler and David Sanger, 
“World Leaders Pledge $1.1 Trillion for Crisis,” New York Times, April 2, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/03/world/
europe/03summit.html?_r=1&ref=europe (accessed July 7, 2009).
53. There are a few exceptions. Two involve notable changes to existing institutions: 1) NATO enlargement and 2) the 
partially successful effort to reduce membership dues in the UN. The G.W. Bush administration created the Proliferation 
Security Initiative (PSI) that is favorably assessed in Amitai Etzioni, “Tomorrow’s Institution Today: The Promise of the 
Proliferation Security Initiative,” Foreign Affairs (May/June 2009).
54. Conventional wisdom in political science has long held that “hegemonic power” is essential to create new international 
institutions. A decline in U.S. standing should make the creation of new IOs more difficult. Evidence on the degree to 
which this is true is mixed. U.S. creation of an alternative climate change forum in 2005, the Asia Pacific Partnership 
on Clean Development and Climate (APP), has met with mixed reviews. It succeeded in attracting members not party 
to Kyoto (both India and China have signed on – a major U.S. goal), but the APP’s goal of voluntary and non-binding 
cooperation is viewed by many Kyoto signatories as unhelpful, even counterproductive. U.S.-led efforts to spread the 
Millennium Challenge approach to development aid only to “precertified” countries have also not caught on. And 
interest in a new Concert of Democracies from both political parties in the U.S. as well as the Bush White House went 
nowhere – other countries were not willing to follow. On the other hand, the Proliferation Security Initiative – a much 
looser, “coalition of the willing” arrangement to combat trafficking in nuclear material – has gained numerous adherents 
and seems likely to persist. 
55. As Nina Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945 (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 284-285, has argued, “[President Ronald] Reagan’s references [in the early 1980s] 
to ‘prevailing’ in and ‘winning’ a nuclear war created fear in Europe and provoked dismayed and outraged responses 
by both the public and a large segment of national security elites that he was retreating from mutual understandings 
36 APSA   •   US Standing in the World: Causes, Consequences, and the Future
about nuclear weapons and deterrence. In the early 1980s millions of demonstrators took to the streets in major Euro-
pean capitals to block the deployments and protest the apparent lack of seriousness about arms control….”
56. Mark L. Haas, The Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics, 1789-1989 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2005).
57. Charles Krauthammer, “Alliance in Ruins?” Washington Post, November 16, 2007, A33.
58. See, e.g., Moises Naim’s “Missing Links: The Hypocrisy Audit,” Foreign Policy (September/October 2008), http://www.
foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4440 (accessed April 10, 2009).
59. Haefele, “John F. Kennedy, USIA, and World Public Opinion,” 78-81.
60. The most recent example is Kristin M. Lord, Voices of America: U.S. Public Diplomacy for the 21st Century (Washington, 
D.C.: Brookings, 2008). Its list of “selected reports” runs to a total of 34 since 2001. Idem, pp. 55-56. See also Nancy Snow 
and Philip M. Taylor, eds., Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy (New York: Routledge, 2009). A notable recent 
academic study is Benjamin Goldsmith and Yusaku Horiuchi, “Spinning the Globe? U.S. Public Diplomacy and Foreign 
Public Opinion,” Journal of Politics 71:3 (2009): 863-875.
61. See Ole R. Holsti, To See Ourselves as Others See Us: How Publics Abroad View the United States after 9/11 (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 2008).
62. Alexei Arbatov, “What Lessons Learned?” in Kiron K. Skinner, ed., Turning Points in Ending the Cold War, (Stanford, CA: 
Hoover Institution Press, 2007), p. 57.
